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TRADE SECRETS
On May 17, 1965, New Jersey enacted a statute' which restates the
common law that trade secrets are property, and provides that stealing ar-
ticles representing trade secrets, including the trade secrets represented, con-
stitutes a crime. New Jersey has thereby taken another step forward in the
law protecting trade secrets. Trade secrets have been protected in this country
ever since the case of Vickery v. Welch,2
 and the concept of the trade secret
as property was developed in Peabody v. Norfolk8
 as early as 1868. There,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant left his employ and made arrange-
ments with a competitor, who knew of the relationship between Peabody
and Norfolk, to build a factory for manufacturing gunny cloth with
machines modeled after plaintiff's and with the latter's secret process. 4 In
overruling defendant's demurrer, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated that one who develops
... a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent
or not, . .. has a property in it, which a court of chancery will
protect against one who in violation of contract and breach of con-
fidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to
third persons. 5
While this case dealt with a process of manufacture, a trade secret may en-
compass many different items, including blueprints,° tables of dimensions,7
machinery,5
 raw material sources,5
 secret pricing codes'° and ingredients."
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving ma-
terials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of cus-
tomers . . . . 12
A trade secret, therefore, can be almost anything useful or advantageous in
business activity that is not generally known or easily or immediately as-
certainable to members of the trade.
1 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:119-5.1 to .5 (1965).
2 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837).
3 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
4
 Id. at 454-55.
5 Id. at 458.
6
 E.g., Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 AU. 4
(1904).
7
 E.g., Merryweather v. Moore, [1892] 2 Ch, 518.
8
 E.g., A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works, 73 F.2d 531 (1934), modified, 74
F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935).
9
 E.g., Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Assmann, 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N.Y. Supp. 334
(1918).
10
 E.g., Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891).
11 E.g., Belmont Labs., Inc. v. Heist, 300 Pa. 542, 151 Atl. 15 (1930).
12
 Restatement, Torts $ 757, comment b (1939).
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Protection of trade secrets is desirable from several viewpoints. The
development of new ideas and the collection and organization of useful in-
formation and data is advantageous to society. The protection of trade secrets
provides an incentive to engage in activities that produce immediate ad-
vantages to the inventor and long-range benefits to the community." If trade
secrets were not protected, corporations would have to spend money, which
could be used for research, on increased security measures." The means by
which trade secrets have been protected in the past have included civil reme-
dies and criminal sanctions.
I. CIVIL REMEDIES
The civil remedies available to an owner who has been illegally deprived
of his trade secret include an injunction against wrongful use or disclosure,"
an accounting for profits,'" an order for the return of plans or copies of the
secret, 17 destruction of the infringing instruments/ 8 or, where such remedy
is adequate, damages.'" For several reasons, however, these remedies may be
inadequate to fully protect the owner of a trade secret.
In many cases, there may be substantial doubt regarding which process
the potential defendant uses and whether he obtained it from the plaintiff.
In such cases, the plaintiff will have to disclose his trade secret in order to
prove that defendant is using it. Plaintiff may thereby frustrate his very
goal of secrecy by bringing suit. 2°
In other cases, the plaintiff may find that he is unable to carry his
burden of proof. The most difficult questions in modern trade secret litigation
are the questions of fact. The relatively simple facts which the courts had
to deal with in the days of Peabody v. Norfolk are not the facts which the
courts face today. The plaintiff today must prove that the subject matter of
the claimed trade secret (a) is not a matter of common knowledge or of
general knowledge in a trade, for if it is such, it is not a secret; and (b)
that it is not a part of the personal skills, knowledge and experience of an-
other, typically his employee, for in such event the secret belongs to a third
person. The line between the employer's proprietary information and the
techniques personal to the skilled employee has become increasingly more
difficult to draw.21
Even if the plaintiff does sue and prevail, his civil remedies may still
prove inadequate. The resulting injunction and possible accounting for profits
seldom leave the taker worse off than before he obtained the secret. 22 Damages
15 Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 4, 31 (1962).
14 Bartenstein, Research Espionage, 17 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 813, 820 (1962).
15 E.g., Irving Iron Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 702, 126 Atl.
291 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924).
10 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Assmann, supra note 9.
17
 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., supra note 6,
15
 See American Bell Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 Fed. 521, 523-24 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
15 Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1946).
20 Doyle & Joslyn, The Role of Counsel in Litigation Involving Technologically
Complex Trade Secrets, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 743-44 (1965).
21
 Note, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 324, 326
(1963).
22 Developments in the Law, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 954 (1964).
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are hardly ever allowed, probably because they are a very difficult item to
prove," and it does not seem likely that most employees would have sufficient
assets to satisfy a judgment against them. It might be otherwise, perhaps, as to
the competitor who hires away key employees, unless the reason for the
hiring away is that the competitor cannot afford any research of his own.
II. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Criminal sanctions for the disclosure of a trade secret have previously
been possible in New York and New Jersey. The New Jersey statute 24 pro-
vides:
Any person who gives, offers or promises any gift or gratuity to
any employee without the knowledge and consent of his employer,
and with intent to influence his action with relation to his em-
ployer's business, and any employee who, without the knowledge
and consent of his employer, requests or accepts any gift or gratuity,
or any promise to make a gift or to do any act beneficial to himself,
under an agreement or understanding that he shall act in any par-
ticular manner to his employer's business, is a disorderly person.25
New York" and New Jersey" each report only a single case in which their
statutes were applied to the theft of a trade secret and in which an actual
gift changed hands. In the New York case, it was found that one who pays
another for the purpose of securing secret machines used by the other's
employer comes within the purview of the statute. The New Jersey case held
that one who offers and pays a sum of money to the employee of a com-
petitor, with intent to procure from him secret formulae used by his em-
ployer in the manufacture of a preparation, violates the statute.
It has been suggested that the New York and New Jersey statutes may
be applicable to the employee who leaves his employment to go to a com-
petitor at a higher salary and who takes documents or other materials of his
employer relating to trade secrets. 28 This view regards the salary increase
as the reward element of the statute, and the taking of documents as the
requisite action in relation to the employer's business. By the same rea-
soning, a competitor who bribes an employee to disclose a trade secret would
be a disorderly person under this statute.
The fact that both New York and New Jersey each report only one
case suggests that the statutes were not adopted with the purpose of pro-
23
 Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 507, 554 n.184
(1939).
24
 N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:170-88 (1953). The New York statute covers the same area,
N.Y. Pen. Law § 439(1) (1930).
25 N.J. Stat. Ann.	 2A:169-4 (1953):
Except as otherwise expressly provided, a person adjudged a disorderly person,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county workhouse, penitentiary or
jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
26
 Applebee v. Skiwanek, 27 N.Y. Crim. 78, 140 N.Y. Supp. 450 (Magic. Ct. 1912).
27
 State v. Landecker, 100 N.j.L. 195, 126 Atl. 408 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 103
N.J.L. 716, 137 AtI. 919 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
28




Letting trade secrets. The wording of the statutes seems to indicate that they
were primarily designed to prevent influence being brought to bear on an
employee's performance of the positive duties of his job rather than to
guard against breach of his negative duty not to betray his employer's secrets.
A typical situation contemplated by these statutes, for example, might be
an attempt by a contractor to secure an employee's acceptance of his bid
where it is the employee's job to award the contracts."
Furthermore, these statutes are not designed to cope with the growing
problem of industrial espionage. Articles in popular magazines and profes-
sional journals show the remarkable growth of business espionage. 30 In the
drug industry, for instance, there exist international "spy rings," with centers
here and abroad, and with markets in which spies can easily unload their
"hot" secrets. 31 Because of the high marketability of drug formulas, process
information and engineering data, it is quite possible that secrets may be sold
to innocent third parties who may proceed in good faith to use the formulas
for manufacture, or to use the data for further engineering and development
of their own." Although this industrial espionage sometimes involves methods
which are criminal in themselves, it may also be accomplished by means
which up to now were not unlawful.
III. THE NEWLY ENACTED NEW JERSEY STATUTE
The statute recently adopted by New Jersey proposes to deal with this
problem of industrial espionage by providing criminal penalties for the un-
lawful taking of trade secrets. Its purpose is
. . . to make clear that articles representing trade secrets, including
the trade secrets represented thereby, . .. can be the subject of
criminal acts. 33
This purpose is accomplished by declaring that trade secrets constitute goods,
chattels and property," and that any person
29 See Note, supra note 21, at 331.
30 See, e.g., Bartenstein, supra note 14; Furash, Industrial Espionage, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Nov.-Dec. 1959, p. 6; Smith, Business Espionage, Fortune, May 1956, p. 118.
31 Bartenstein, supra note 14, at 818.
32 Id. at 820.
33 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:119-5.1 (1965).
34 A similar approach has been taken in Illinois, which recently amended its
Criminal Code to include trade secrets under property that is subject to theft. The
Criminal Code of 1961 now reads;
As used in this Part C [of the Criminal Code dealing with "Offenses Directed
Against Property"], property . . . includes . . samples, cultures, micro-
organisms, specimens, records, recordings, documents, blueprints, drawings, maps,
and whole or partial copies, descriptions, photographs, prototypes or models
thereof, or any other articles, materials, devices, substances and whole or partial
copies, descriptions, photographs, prototypes, or models thereof which con-
stitute, represent, evidence, reflect or record a secret scientific, technical, merchan-
dising, production or management information, design, formula, invention, or
improvement.
Ill. Rev. Stat, ch. 15, § 1 (1965).
Similarly, a bill introduced in the House of Representatives on March 11, 1965,
and referred to the Judiciary Committee for further action proposes to make the stealing
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.. who with intent to deprive or withhold from the owner thereof
the control of a trade secret, or with an intent to appropriate a trade
secret to his own use or to the use of another,
(a) steals or embezzles an article representing a trade secret, or,
(b) without authority makes or causes to be made a copy of an
article representing a trade secret, . . . (Emphasis added.) 85
is guilty of a misdemeanor if the value of the article is Tess than $200 and
of a high misdemeanor if such value is $200 or more. An "article" in turn is
defined as
any object, material, device or substance or copy thereof, including
any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample, specimen, prototype,
model, photograph, micro-organism, blueprint or map 3 6
This approach to the protection of trade secrets via the concept of the
trade secret as property is not new. As indicated above, Peabody v. Norfolk"
had already established the trade secret as a property right, and several years
later the court in Tabor v. Hoffman confirmed the property concept in the
following language:
It is conceded by the appellant that, independent of copyright or
letters patent, an inventor or author, has, by the common law, an
exclusive property in his invention or composition, until by publica-
tion, it becomes the property of the general public. This concession
seems to be well founded and to be sustained by authority."
It is to be noted that trade secrets have been treated as property rights
in a great variety of situations, including such cases where they have been
found to be taxable," transferrable, 4° and to pass under statutes of descent
and distribution; 41 they have been dealt with as property of the firm upon
dissolution of a partnershi P42 and under statutes requiring stock of a cor-
of a trade secret transmitted in interstate commerce or used in connection with a product
in interstate commerce a federal crime. It defines trade secret as
any confidential technical or other confidential business information, regardless
of whether it is in written or other tangible form, which is not generally availa-
ble to the public and which gives one who uses it an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. [It includes but is not limited tol secret formulas,
processes, patterns, drawings, specifications, memoranda, maps, lists, statistics,
and any copies thereof regardless of by whom made.
H.R. 5578, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
35
 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:119-5.3 (1965).
36 N.J. Stat. Ann. $ 2A:119-5.2(a) (1965).
37 Supra note 3.
38
 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).
39
 In re Brandreth's Estate, 28 Misc. 468, 59 N.Y. Supp. 1092 (Surr. Ct. 1899).
40 See, e.g., Grand Rapids Wood Finishing Co. v. Hatt, 152 Mich. 132, 115 N.W. 714
(1908); Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N.J. Eq. 293, 78 Atl. 698 (Ch. 1910) ; Lamont
Corliss & Co. v. Bonnie Blend Chocolate Corp., 135 Misc. 537, 238 N.Y. Supp. 78 (Sup.
Ct. 1929).
41
 Peabody v. Norfolk, supra note 3; Glass v. Kottwitz, 297 S.W. 573 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927).
42
 Baldwin v. Von Micheroux, 5 Misc. 386, 25 N.Y. Supp. 852 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
328
CURRENT LEGISLATION
paration to be paid for in property. 43
 It should also be noted, however, that
even though a trade secret has been and may be deemed a property right, it
should be regarded so in only a limited sense. The property right disappears
when the information embraced by the trade secret becomes public or the
secret is discovered independently by others." Furthermore, the protect-
ability of the property depends upon the circumstances under which the trade
secret is disclosed: an innocent person, e.g., a bona fide purchaser, is per-
mitted to use it without consent, while a person who violated a confidence
may not use it.45
Labelling trade secrets as property, therefore, does not lead to a clear
concept. The conceptual difficulties may well lead to problems in the pro-
tectability of trade secrets under the newly enacted New Jersey statute. Any
statute that proposes to deal effectively with the theft of trade secrets,
particularly with regard to organized crime," cannot stop short by dealing
only with the more mundane types of theft such as the removal of plans,
maps and generally tangible objects, but must also cover the more ingenious
types of espionage, such as the planting of microphones in executives' desks 47
and other sophisticated schemes. 48 But the instant statute does not seem to
cover the appropriation of intangible information. Such appropriation could,
if at all, possibly be subsumed under section 5.3 (b), which makes it a mis-
demeanor for any person to make or cause to be made a copy of an article
that represents a trade secret. This requires, however, that the appropriated
information relate to some tangible property, because only the making of a
copy of an article that represents a trade secret is a misdemeanor under sec-
tion 5.3 (b). But a trade secret may properly include such intangible informa-
tion as negotiations for a contract, a chemical formula that has not been
reduced to writing or the intention to produce a new consumer good. Since
there is no article involved in these secrets, their appropriation cannot fall
within the protection of section 5.3(b). 4°
IV. PROTECTION OF INTANGIBLE TRADE SECRETS
The difficulty of protecting intangible information, such as ideas and
plans that have not been reduced to writing but must nevertheless be commu-
nicated between the originator and the persons executing them, has led to
the suggestion that trade secret protection be placed within the law of unfair
43
 Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed. 609 (6th Cir. 1916).
44
 Stedman, supra note 13, at 21.
43 Ibid.
46
 The "Introductory Statement" of the New Jersey statute states:
In recent years, trade secrets have increasingly become the subject of theft, both
by individuals and groups working inside industry and by conspiracies involving
outsiders. Recently the participation of organized crime in these thefts has become
alarmingly evident.
N.J. Stat. Ann. Hi 2A:119-5.1 to .5 (1965).
47 Smith, supra note 30, at 121.
48 See, e.g., Letter From Louis E. Garner, Jr. to Editors of Fortune, in Fortune, June
1956, pp. 18, 20.
43
 The Illinois amendment to the Criminal Code and the bill introduced in the
House of Representatives suffer from the same defect since they limit the concept of
the trade secret to tangible property. See note 34 supra.
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competition. 5° This would be appropriate because the great majority of trade
secret invasions accompany efforts to obtain competitive advantages over,
or to overcome a competitive advantage possessed by, the victim." The neces-
sary deterrent can be provided by criminal sanctions. This approach has
been taken in Germany 52 and other European countries."
The German Law Against Unfair Competition provides:
(1) Any employee, laborer or apprentice of a business who during
the term of his employment, for purposes of competition, personal
gain, or with the intent to harm the owner of the business, without
authorization communicates a trade or business secret entrusted or
accessible to him by virtue of his employment, shall be punished
by imprisonment up to three years and fine or by one of these.
(2) Any person who, for purposes of competition or personal gain,
without authorization communicates or uses a trade or business
secret acquired as a result of a communication described in subsec-
tion (1) above or by an act contrary to law" or public policy"
shall be subject to the same penalty as in subsection (1) above."
These sections are broad enough to include anything that is not generally
known and that may aid the victim to carry on his business. 57 In particular,
the statute avoids defining trade or business secrets, so that the courts are
not limited in their interpretation of what constitutes a trade secret. Thus,
a case decided by the German Supreme Court in 1913 held that the plan
5° Klein, supra note 28, at 461; Barton, supra note 23, at 537-38.
51 See, e.g., Eastern Extracting Co. v. Greater New York Extracting Co., 126 App.
Div. 928, 110 N.Y. Stipp. 738 (1908) (spy placed in competitor's plant).
52 Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, [hereinafter cited as UWG], Law of
June 7, 1909, [19091 Reichsgesetzblatt 499 (Ger.); SchOnfelder 73 (35th ed. 1963).
53 See, e.g., Code Penal art. 418 (Fr. 60th ed. Dalloz 1963); Bundesgesetz fiber den
unlauteren Wettbewerb (Federal Law Regarding Unfair Competition), Law of Sept. 30,
1943 (Swit.), art. 13, §§ f, g; Code Penal Suisse art. 162 (2d ed. Panchaud 1962).
54 An act is contrary to law if it violates any German criminal or civil statute,
e.g., if the secret material is obtained by theft, trespass or embezzlement or if a person
is forced to disclose a trade secret by fraud or blackmail, the act is contrary to law.
See Reimer, Wettbewerbs- und Warenzeichenrecht 764 (3d ed. 1954).
55
 The concept of public policy in the area of unfair competition is not clearly
defined. A formula that has been developed by the courts must be interpreted and applied
in each individual case: The standard for public policy is to be taken from the morally
and legally refined opinion of the business community; if such opinion, however, should
adversely affect the interests of the general community, the opinion of the business
community is no longer solely relevant. See Baumbach-Hefermehl, Wettbewerbs- und
Warenzeichenrecht 88-89 (8th ed. 1960).
56 UWG §§ 17(1), (2). Translation by the writer.
57
 The circle of protection is drawn very wide and includes attempts and offers to
commit the offense of unlawful appropriation of a trade secret:
(1) Any person who, for purposes of competition or personal gain, attempts to
induce another to commit an offense under §§ 17 or 18, or accepts the offer of
another to commit such an offense, shall be punished with imprisonment up to
two years or fine.
(2) Any person, who for purposes of competition or personal gain offers on
his own or on the initiative of another to commit an offense against §§ 17 or
18, shall be subject to the same penalty as in § 20(1) above.




of a manufacturer to bring on the market brooches and cups inlaid with a
new enamel pattern on the occasion of the 1911 Leipzig Fair constituted a
trade secret. The court did not limit the holding to the new enamel design
but expressly included the "idea" to be the only exhibitor and seller of
these new goods at the fair." Other cases have held that the conclusion of
contracts or the intent to conclude a contract is a trade secret.'" More re-
cently, conditions of payment that were not written down but in the course
of business experience had developed in addition to the printed forms" and
preferential rates granted to a purchasing cooperative". have been held to
be trade secrets. The concept of the trade secret, as interpreted by the German
courts, does, therefore include intangible information so that the Law Against
Unfair Competition can be an effective tool in the protection of these trade
secrets that have not been reduced to a material form.
Two other solutions have been proposed for the protection of trade
secrets. The first approach is patterned on the patent and copyright laws and
suggests a limited statutory protection after the secret has been disclosed. 62
Such an approach is comparable to the German "Gebrauchsmuster" 63 and
would protect trade secrets for a limited time—perhaps for five years with the
possibility of renewal—as a reward for the disclosure and the registration
of the secret." Although the adoption of •this plan looks attractive on its
face, it might create more problems than it solves. Apart from the fact that
a new body would have to be set up to administer the act, it could turn out
to be extremely difficult to formulate a meaningful standard for this "little
patent." If the standard of invention required of a patent is itself uncertain,"
a trade secrets standard that is patterned on the patent standard but which
is less demanding is likely to be more uncertain."
The other approach is also modeled on the patent law and would adopt
a statute allowing the trial judge to award treble damages67 in trade secret
cases." But a treble damage provision would most likely not be very effective
against a defecting employee," and is also open to the same objections that
were raised against the civil remedies as protection for the owners of trade
secrets.7°
58
 Judgment of 1913, 48 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [herein-
after cited as RGSt] 14 (Ger.).
59
 Judgment of 1906, RGSt, [1906] Juristische Wochenschrift 497.
oo Judgment of Aug. 21, 1936, RGSt, [1936] Juristische Wochenschrift 3471.
61
 Judgment of Feb. 20, 1959, Oberlandesgericht Diisseldorf, [1959] Der Wett-
bewerb in Recht and Praxis 182.
62
 Stedman, supra note 13, at 32-34.
63
 Gebrauchsmustergesetz, Law of May 5, 1936, [1936] Reichsgesetzblatt II 130
(Ger.); Schiinfelder 71 (35th ed. 1963).
64 Stedman, supra note 13, at 33.
65
 See Note, The Statutory Standard of Invention: Section 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, 3 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 317 (1959).
66 Note, supra note 21, at 348.
67
 66 Stat. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964).
68
 Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 955.
69 Ibid.
70 See pp. 325-26 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
Civil remedies are inadequate for the protection of trade secrets because
trade secret litigation involves many risks and a prospective plaintiff prob-
ably will not be able to collect any damages. In addition, the defendant will
usually be in no worse position than before he unlawfully appropriated the
trade secret. By imposing fairly stiff penalties, 71 the New Jersey statute
should produce a deterrent effect so that industry will be saved a sizable
expenditure of money and trouble in the defense and protection of its trade
secrets. The statute also serves to eliminate some defenses to larceny prosecu-
tions which were formerly available. Under the regular larceny statute, a
criminal might have asserted that he only photographed or copied the article
and consequently did not "take" any property, or he might have asserted
that he intended to return the article, after copying the secret, and con-
sequently did not intend to deprive the owner "permanently". of his prop-
erty. These defenses are eliminated under the new statute. 72
The New Jersey statute, therefore, takes a step in the right direction,
even though it limits the concept of trade secrets to tangible information.
The ultimate success of the new sanction, however, will depend upon how ef-
fectively it is enforced. Prosecutors exercise an almost unlimited discretion
in the choice of offenders and offenses to prosecute," and judicial controls,
where they exist, are rarely exercised and difficult to obtain. 74
RAINER M. KOHLER
71 If the value of the article stolen, embezzled or copied, including the value of the
trade secret represented thereby, is less than $200, the offense is a misdemeanor which
is punishable by a fine of $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than three years, or
both, and if such value is $200 or more, the offense is a high misdemeanor which is
punishable by a fine of not more than $2,000, or by imprisonment for not more than
seven years, or both. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:85-6, -7 (1953).
72 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:119-5.3 (1965).
78 The relevant statute provides:
Each prosecutor ... shall use all reasonable and lawful diligence for the detection,
arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the laws.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:158-5 (1953).
74
 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 560-61 (1960);
Snyder, The District Attorney's Hardest Task, 30 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 167 (1939).
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